



Prop. 13 Nine Years later
In 1978, California voters passed Proposition 13,
the pathbreaking property tax limitation initia-
tive aimed at controlling the size of local gov-
ernment. This Letter examines the effects of
Proposition 13 on local government revenues in
California and on the extent of differentiation
among localities in terms of the quantity and
composition of taxes and public spending. The
evidence suggests that Proposition 13 has
reduced the overall size of local government in
California, but that it has had little effect on fis-
cal differentiation among school districts and
cities.
Differentiation among local governments
Statewide initiatives that limit local governments
potentially could interfere with the federal sys-
tem of government, in which different levels of
government provide different types of public or
quasi-public goods and services. In the federal
system as practiced in the United States, the
national government is responsible for providing
the "pure" public goods, such as defense, which
must be consumed by all if they are consumed
by any.
Most services provided by local governments,
including education, fire and police protection,
and road maintenance, are hybrids between
pure public goods and the private goods sold on
ordinary markets. These quasi-public goods
combine some of the qualities of private and
public goods. Like private goods, they can be
priced because individuals benefit directly from
them and the cost of providing services rises
with the number of individuals served. They also
have the public quality of benefitting some who
do not directly consume them as, for example,
when a fire department protects a neighborhood
by putting out a fire in one house.
Because of their "spillover" effects, quasi-public
goods cannot be provided efficiently, in an eco-
nomic sense, through private markets alone.
Instead, they are particularly well-suited to
provision by local governments because juris-
dictional fragmentation creates rudimentary
"markets" that allow individuals, by choosing a
place to live, to select the combination of taxes
and public services that suits their tastes and
needs.
Measures that circumscribe local governments,
such as Proposition 13, potentially could limit
the extent to which jurisdictions can differentiate
themselves from one another. Such limitation
would prevent some individua'ls from consum-
ing the level and type of government services
that they would have chosen and for which they
would have paid in the absence of restrictions.
Proposition 13 and California taxes
Proposition 13, passed in 1978, placed a one-
percent ceiling on property tax rates and stipu-
lated that a higher rate could not be imposed
without a two-thirds majority of voters. Since
effective property taxes had averaged about 2.7
percent of total assessed valuation in 1978,
Proposition 13 immediately cut property tax
rates dramatically.
In addition, the initiative rolled back all assessed
property values to their 1976 levels. Assessed
values could rise by no more than 2 percent per
year or the inflation rate, whichever was lower.
Upon sale, however, properties automatically
would be reassessed at their market value.
These tax rate cuts, and the imposition of a max-
imum tax rate, would decrease the variation in
tax rates,but their impact on tax revenues is
unclear since property tax revenues are a func-
tion of wealth as well as of tax rates. Before
Proposition 13, tax rates and wealth tended to
be inversely related since a wealthy district
could raise a given amount of money with a
lower tax rate than could a less wealthy district.
After Proposition 13, less wealthy districts no
longer could levy higher tax rates to compensate
for their lower wealth, so the variation in reve-
nues actually could have risen.
The dramatic changes that Proposition 13
wrought in California's fiscal environment are
illustrated in the chart. In fiscal year 1977-78
(hereafter "1978"), just before Proposition 13FRBSF
took effect, 6.4 percent of California personal
income went toward paying property taxes. In
the following year, the property tax burden had
fallen by more than half, to 3 percent of per-
sonal income. Property taxes provided 40 per-
cent of all state and local tax revenue in
California during 1978, but only 25 percent in
1979.
Asa result,California.'s tota.l state and local tax
burden fell from 15.8 percent of personal
income in 1978 to 12.1 percent in 1979. By
1984, the burden had fallen still further, to 11.5
percent. This dramatic decrease in the total state
and local tax burden occurred with no signifi-
cant changes in the burdens of sales or personal
income taxes, and was almost entirely due to
Proposition 13. (In 1977, gas, cigarette, alcohol,
and corporate income taxes together comprised
60 percent of miscellaneous taxes.)
Effect on local jurisdictions
While Proposition 13 clearly reduced the total
state and local tax burden, it affected different
types of local jurisdictions differently. For exam-
ple, school districts and cities had different func-
tions and revenue sources, and therefore had
different responses to the changes in the fiscal
environment.
School districts
The degree of differentiation in spending levels
among school districts appears to have declined
during the decade that ended in the early 1980s.
According to calculations by Osman and
Gemello, in 1974 a $256 per pupil gap sepa-
rated the twenty-fifth andseventy-fifth percen-
tiles for revenue limits among unified school
districts. By 1983, the gap had narrowed to $67
in inflation-adjusted 1974 dollars.
For school districts, the property tax wasa par-
ticularly important revenue source during the
early 1970s. In 1972, the property tax accounted
for 54 percent ofschool district funds, and
school districts consumed 52 percent of all
property tax revenues. School district financing
had changed significantlyeven before Proposi-
tion 13, due to the 1971 Serrano decision in
which the California Supreme Court ruled that it
was unconstitutional for some school districts to
provide inferior schooling because low wealth
limited their property taxing capacity.
Starting in 1974, the state implemented Serrano
by placing a cap on the amount of property tax
revenues per pupil that school districts could
raise. At the same time, a minimum per pupil
spending level was established for all school dis-
tricts. State funds filled the gap between the
1973 property tax revenue base and the mini-
mum per pupil spending level for those districts
with low property tax revenues. As a result, the
share of property tax revenues in total school
district funds fell to 46 percent in 1974, when
Serrano was implemented, while the share of
state aid (generated by state income and sales
taxes) rose commensurately.
In 1978, Proposition 13 drastically reduced the
amount of property tax money available to
school districts, thereby increasing the gap
between property tax revenues and the mini-
mum spending level and dramatically expanding
the role of state aid. By 1985, the state provided
63 percent of school revenues, and property
taxes accounted for only 22 percent of school
funds. The overall per pupil level of school
spending changed little after Proposition 13.
Because Serrano was aimed explicitly at limiting
spending differences among school districts, it
likely bears more direct responsibility for reduc-
ing the degree of differentiation in district spend-
ing levels than does Proposition 13. Neverthe-
less, Proposition 13 probably reinforced the
trend by accelerating the replacement of prop-
erty tax revenues by state aid.
Cities
City financing changed significantly after Propo-
sition 13, but the evidence suggests that cities
experienced little or no change in their ability to
differentiate themselves from one another.
California cities, traditionally having few spend-
ing mandates from higher levels of government,
are relatively free to spend their money as they
see fit. Typical city services include fire and
police protection, streets, parks, and libraries.
Cities also can tap a relatively broad range of
revenue sources, including taxes on sales, hotel
rooms, utility use, and business licenses, as well
as charges for services rendered. In 1978, prop-
erty taxes provided 14 percent of total city reve-
nues while nonproperty taxes provided 19
percent, current service charges 31 percent,
state and federal grants 20 percent, and mis-
cellaneous other sources the remainder.
Thus, cities appear to have been less vulnerable
than school districts to Proposition 13-related
declines in property tax revenues. However,
prior to Proposition 13 they were more able to
differentiate themselves from each other than
school districts were, in terms of both the quan-California State and Local Tax
Revenues Per $1000 Personal Income
Excludes the City and County of San Francisco
~ Passage of
~ Proposition 13
For these cities, real per capita revenues on
average fell about 10 percent between 1978 and
1985, although some cities made gains. The i
standard deviation, which measures the extent
of differentiation in the level of revenues, fell
slightly, from $240 to $235, while the ratio of
the standard deviation to the mean rose slightly,
from 0.617 to 0.671 . These changes suggest that
cities as a group lost revenues following the dual
shocks of Proposition 13 and the cuts in federal
grants, but their ability to differentiate them-
selves from each other did not change
significantly.
so summary statistics were calculated for two
years using data from two counties only. These
two counties, Alameda and Contra Costa, com-
prise the Oakland Metropolitan Statistical Area
(MSA) and, in 1985, included 31 cities that var-
ied substantially in terms ofthe incomes and
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tity and mix of services they provided, so the
potential for change in differentiability among
cities was greater.
The impact of Proposition 13 on California cities
was complicated by the loss of substantial
federal grant money. Between 1978 and 1985,
inflation-adjusted federal grants to cities fell by
50 percent as the federal government rolled
back its grants-in-aid programs. Proposition 13
and reduced federal funds together caused total
city revenues to fall substantially relative to per-
sonal income after 1979.
As it turned out, cities were able to compensate
for those losses by increasing their use of alter-
native revenue sources. By 1985, their total rev-
enues stood only 4.4 percent below the level in
1978, just before Proposition 13 was imple-
mented. Between 1978 and 1985, revenues
from nonproperty taxes grew 19 percent, "mis-
cellaneous" revenues (primarily investment and
rental income) grew 62 percent, and service
charge revenues rose 13 percent.
One way to explore whether the constraints on
cities affected the extent to which they could dif-
ferentiate themselves from one another is by
examining the variation in revenue across cities.
Calculating a consistent data set for all Califor-
nia cities is a prohibitively time-consuming task,
Conclusions
On the whole, Proposition 13 appears to have
reduced the size of local government, as mea-
sured by taxes paid as a proportion of personal
income, but it has had little apparent effect on
the degree of spending variation among local
governments.
For most localities,the changes wrought by
Proposition 13 appear to have been tempered by
increased reliance on otherrevenue instruments.
School districts now rely more heavily on state
aid, although Serrano bears most of the respon-
sibility for that change. As a result, the level of
differentiation has decreased for school .districts
since Proposition 13 was passed.
Among a small sample of cities, the variation in
revenues has not changed significantly.since
Proposition 13 took effect. City revenues con-
tinue to be derived primarily from local sources.
Proposition 13's impact on cities wascompli-
cated by the sharp reduction in federal grants
that occurred at about the same time, but both
shocks to city finance were mitigated by cities'
initial limited reliance on property taxes and by
their abiIity to increase revenues from alternative
sources, such as service charges and non-
property taxes.
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,BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)










Loans, Leases and Investments1 2 204,446 - 287 1,560 0.7
Loans and Leases1 6 180,922 - 438 - 2,735 - 1.4
Commercial and Industrial 51,188 178 267 0.5
Real estate 69,928 81 2,691 4.0
Loans to Individuals 36,953 54 - 4,150 - 10.0
Leases 5,425 2 - 82 - 1.4
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 16,547 126 5,060 44.0
OtherSecurities2 6,976 24 - 768 - 9.9
Total Deposits 204,890 - 1,388 - 1,294 - 0.6
Demand Deposits 50,590 - 1,047 - 718 - 1.3
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 35,566 - 820 290 0.8
OtherTransaction Balances4 19,793 - 131 2,885 17.0
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 134,507 - 210 - 3,461 - 2.5
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 45,078 651 - 1,875 - 3.9
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000ormore 31,294 - 162 - 4,292 - 12.0
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 23,803 - 21 - 1,023 - 4.1
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures
Reserve Position, All Reporting Banks
Excess Reserves (+)/Deficiency(-)
Borrowings











1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading accountsecurities
3 Excludes U.S. governmentand depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOW and savings accounts with telephone transfers
s Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
7 Annualized percent change